INTRODUCTION
Drug policy reform is almost a non-issue in American government. ' The only politically viable stance is a hardline position against all illegal drugs with harsh penalties for offenders. Congress has attempted to stifle research into alternative drug policies by introducing House Bill 135.3 This only illuminates the boldness of the Canadian Senate, 4 which released a report in September of 2002 recommending that the federal government legalize marijuana for use by Canadian citizens ages sixteen and over. 5 This recommendation may or may not turn into actual policy. Nevertheless, it is a major step toward a policy change, and just as shocking, it is a strong indicator of a shift in public opinion on marijuana policy. 6 * J.D. candidate, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; expected graduation date, May 2004. Many thanks go to my fianced, Megan, for tolerating my absence during the writing process and to The Simpsons for keeping me laughing and sane. Thanks also go to the good people who created Folger's French Vanilla coffee, which kept me alert for far longer than a human being should be in a 24-hour period.
The Canadian Senate's recommendation is even more surprising when considered in light of the marijuana policy of the Netherlands, which is generally regarded as one of the most liberal in the world. 7 The two policies are illustrative of the point that different historical backgrounds and different surroundings breed different policies regarding social ills, or in the case of these two countries, perceived social ills -ones that should be regulated and limited by public policy, not prohibited by it.
Part I of this Note examines the historical background of Canadian marijuana policy from the initial ban to the current proposal. This includes an analysis of the recently modified policy regarding the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes 8 and an evaluation of the current penalties for the commission of common marijuana-related crimes. 9 Finally, Part I explores the steps leading up to the preparation and issuance of the Canadian Senate's report.' 0 Part II outlines the proposal made by the Canadian Senate. The report contains recommendations for sweeping modifications in many areas of marijuana policy, all of which will be reviewed." The report also contains a myriad of statistics and medical data regarding the physiological, psychological, and sociological effects of marijuana, which will be discussed as well. Also, Part II briefly investigates possible local and international obstacles that may prevent Canada from implementing its proposal.
Part H1 discusses the marijuana policy of the Netherlands beginning with a brief historical look at the evolution of Dutch drug policy from after World War II to the decriminalization of marijuana in 1976. It further examines the 8. See Institute of Medicine, Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base, The National Academy of Sciences, available at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/ marimed/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003). As a result of several states taking steps to allow the use of marijuana for therapeutic purposes, the Institute of Medicine's study was commissioned by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy in January of 1997. See id. at 1. The various states that are putting forth efforts to allow the use of marijuana include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. See id. The report thoroughly discussed the merits and drawbacks of marijuana and concluded that the chemicals derived from cannabis, called cannabinoids, could be useful in the treatment of chronic pain related to cancer. See id. at 144. It was determined that clinical trials would be necessary. See id. The Institute also examined some beneficial side effects of cannabinoids including appetitestimulation, vomit-suppression, and sedation. [Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS current state of Dutch marijuana policy and evaluates its results in Dutch society. Finally, Part IV compares the Canadian proposal to the current Dutch policy, focusing on the differing backdrops giving rise to both the Canadian proposal and the Dutch policy. The structures of their respective political systems also had an impact on their choices in drug policy. The Dutch policy cannot be directly transplanted into the Canadian legal system, a phenomenon that will also be discussed in Part IV. This Note also observes a problem that Canada and the Netherlands may have in common, being neighbors of the United States and Germany, respectively, countries with strict anti-drug policies.
12
This Note will not determine whether the passage of the Canadian proposal into law is likely or unlikely. Such a determination is chiefly an exercise in speculation. The significance of the proposal at this stage lies mainly in the fact that the Canadian government took an objective look at a politically sensitive issue. The fact that the results of that examination were a drastic departure from Canada's current policy and the policies of most industrialized nations compounds this significance even further.
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF CANADIAN MARIJUANA POLICY
Marijuana's history in Canada has been relatively consistent. The drug has been illegal in Canada even before it became accepted as a recreational drug and has remained illegal ever since, despite Parliamentary studies that essentially concluded that marijuana's effects were probably less harmful than the short and long-term social costs associated with criminal prosecutions of marijuana offenders. 13 Recent years have marked a loosening of the formerly harsh treatment of the drug with the reduction of most maximum sentences for marijuana offenses and the acknowledgement that marijuana seems to have some value in easing the suffering of those with grave and terminal illnesses. 4 These trends are indicative of a change in legislative and public attitude toward marijuana in general. 
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IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
A. The Initial Ban
Before any honest discussion of drug policy can take place, an understanding of why certain drugs were banned in the first place is essential. The social and political pressures that were present during the initial formation of drug policy must be reexamined in light of 100 years of progression in medical science and public policy. The beginnings of marijuana policy are the key to understanding its current state and future.
Drugs have a nearly century-long tradition of prohibition in Canada beginning with the ban of opium in 1908.17 The Opium Act, 8 24. See Cannabis Report, supra note 5, at 253. This broad power was granted to the Governor to quickly prohibit new drugs that might spread quickly through society rather than waiting for legislation to be passed through the typical parliamentary channels. See id.
25. See id.
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Minister of Health Henri-Sdverin Bdland almost casually added cannabis to this list in 1923 when he simply announced, "[tihere is a new drug in the schedule. '26 The reasons for his decision to include cannabis remain unclear since there were no substantiated reports of recreational cannabis use until the 1930' S. 27 The physiological and psychological effects of cannabis were not even addressed in the Canadian Parliament until 1932, which makes Bdland's decision to ban it rather perplexing. 28 But with the 1923 addition of cannabis to the Schedules, possession and trafficking of cannabis without a license became illegal in all Canadian provinces, punishable by imprisonment from six months up to seven years or a fine up to $1,000.29
Meanwhile, marijuana was gaining a broader base of recreational users in the United States, and as a result, the American media threw the country into a mild panic. 3 " Canadian newspapers latched onto these stories as well, resulting in police officers giving terrible accounts of young Canadians whose minds and bodies were destroyed from marijuana use. 3 ' As the frequency of these reports increased, federal parliamentary attitudes toward cannabis and drugs in general became more hostile, culminating with the 1932 amendments to the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act. 32 The new amendments were mainly procedural, such as prohibiting convicted drug offenders from appealing their convictions for numerous offenses. 33. See Dubois, supra note 29, at 23-24. Appeals were severely limited for the following offenses: (1) a physician prescribing a drug for non-medical purposes; (2) a physician refusing to provide required information relating to the preparation of prescription drugs; (3) obtaining the same drug from two physicians; (4) a pharmacist selling a product containing specified quantities of illegal drugs to children under two years of age without proper labeling; (5) a pharmacist refusing to keep records of drug purchases, sales, and renewals; (6) possession of paraphernalia; and (7) "drug trafficking by mail." Id. Offenses one, two, four, and five involve health care professionals who may lawfully prescribe specific amounts of certain narcotics, such as morphine, in the treatment of pain and disease. See Cannabis Report, supra note 5, at 263.
2003]
Unlike for other prohibited drugs, Canada's climate was ideal for growing and producing cannabis.' Section 3 of the 1938 Act prohibited growing cannabis without a permit from the Department of Health. 35 Parliamentary debates show that the Department of Agriculture had conducted experiments on industrial hemp by growing cannabis at farms in Ottawa and Montreal, and private businessmen were producing hemp as well. 36 The 1938 Act made further production illegal. 37 By 1938, all major cannabis offenses were enumerated in the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act. 38 1938 marked the complete integration of Canada's ban on marijuana and its derivatives. In the years to follow, that policy would significantly evolve.
B. A New Philosophy
The 1954 amendments to the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act helped to modernize the act by adding an offense for possession with intent to distribute and increasing the maximum prison term for this and all trafficking offenses to fourteen years. 39 However, the events of 1955 were even more significant in moving Canadian policy in-line with late twentieth century philosophy.
In The work of the committee will largely be to consider the causes of this unfortunate problem with which this country is faced, to hear expert witnesses and to determine in what way the Government can make its most valuable contribution in resolving this unfortunate condition. The reports of this committee, based upon objective, cautious and factual assessment of the problem, may well become a document of the utmost importance and have far-reaching consequences in helping to found policy upon which the successful solution of this problem can rest. Id. at 264-65.
[Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS Essentially, the Committee set out to evaluate the effectiveness of Canadian drug policy and reexamine its basic philosophy. 4 The Committee heard testimony from fifty-two witnesses in various fields including law enforcement and medicine. 42 Medical witnesses, testifying primarily on the topic of addiction, probably had the most crucial impact on the Committee's conclusions. 43 They testified that the majority of addicts in Canada were so-called "criminal addicts," ones who typically came from less affluent backgrounds and whose addiction became known not through voluntary treatment but contact with the criminal justice system, either by way of convictions under the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act or another law that revealed their addiction."
This testimony led the Committee to conclude that drug addiction was a criminal problem, a social evil that should be deterred through strict enforcement of drug policy as opposed to simply funneling addicts into treatment centers. 45 The Committee reported that "the evidence of medical authorities was to the effect that drug addiction is not a disease in itself. It is a symptom or a manifestation of character weaknesses or personality defects in the individual." ' Based on this philosophy, the Committee rejected, without dissent, the idea of establishing treatment centers run by the government to assist addicts. It argued, instead, that localities should more strictly enforce other provisions of the criminal codes, believing this would indirectly solve the addiction problem. 48 The theory was that by curbing prostitution, theft, vagrancy, and other crimes that drug addicts would likely commit, local police could drastically decrease the addiction problem. 49 The Committee recommended that incarcerated addicts be isolated from the rest of the prison population to 
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avoid spreading addiction within the penitentiary, and during their stay, addicts would receive treatment and specialized training to aid the rehabilitation process and help addicts deal with the specific troubles they face. 5° In addition, harsher penalties for trafficking offenses were recommended to attack the illegal drug supply. 5 The majority of the Committee's recommendations were enacted into law in 1961 with the passage of the Narcotic Control Act. 52 The Act increased trafficking penalties, carrying a twenty-five year maximum prison term as well as introducing the treatment provisions discussed above. 53 The purpose of these new provisions was to address all illegal drugs and not cannabis specifically.
C. The Le Dain Commission
The Le Dain Commission was formed in 1969 with the mission to examine Canada's drug policies. 4 Parliament gave the Commission broad discretion to conduct its study, and its purpose was, in many respects, similar to the Special Committee of the Senate on the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs in Canada. 5 " Unlike the Committee, however, the Le Dain Commission did a more extensive study into marijuana use itself and issued a report on the topic in 1972.56
At the outset of their report, the Commission made several "observations" about the nature of marijuana policy in Canada. 57 Most significantly, the Commission observed that the criminalization of marijuana was done "without any apparent scientific basis nor any real sense of social urgency [.] , 58 It also observed that in a three-year span the proportion of possession fines handed down for marijuana use increased from one percent in 1968 to seventy- [Vol. 14:1 seven percent in 197l.' 9 This could be an indicator of many facts: a drastic increase in use, better enforcement by police, the movement of cannabis to the foreground of drug culture, or most likely, a combination of all three. In a novel approach, the Commission focused its recommendations and its conclusions on the relative harm, to both the individual and society, caused by marijuana. 6° Although it did not have access to much scientific data, the Commission concluded not only that the harms caused by marijuana use were inconclusive but also that they appeared to be "less serious than those which may result from excessive use of alcohol. ' It qualified this assessment by noting that the effects of long-term marijuana use could not be measured because of its relative infancy as a recreational drug. 62 Even though the harms caused by marijuana did not appear severe, the Commission did not feel that a policy of decriminalization or legalization was an appropriate recommendation. 63 The Commission concluded that the government still had an obligation to protect the country's youth from exposure to harmful substances. 64 Based on this rationale, the Commission found it inappropriate to legalize marijuana for use and distribution, instead believing that increased availability of marijuana, even at controlled quantities and qualities, would lead to increased use and increased abuse, primarily among those already using marijuana. 65 With this in mind, it recommended that current offenses for cannabis trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and importing and exporting should remain in the Narcotic Control Act. 66 The Commission was more liberal with respect to sentencing. The Commission saw a problem with lumping a less harmful drug like marijuana together with more harmful drugs like cocaine, 67 and therefore, it concluded that the negative consequences of a cannabis conviction to the individual were 
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much greater than the negative consequences of the crime itself. 68 Aside from a potentially long prison term or large fine, those convicted often could not obtain employment, were stigmatized by neighbors, and subjected to restricted travel rights; these consequences of a criminal conviction were deemed severe when contrasted with the seemingly negligible impact on the user's health.
69
With this background in mind, the Commission made several recommendations for marijuana policy change. It suggested decreased penalties for trafficking offenses and giving a judge the option of not ordering imprisonment. 7° It advocated the repeal of simple possession of cannabis. 7 ' It wanted to modify trafficking offenses to include importation and exportation and exclude non-sale transactions in which an individual gives another a small amount of marijuana at no charge. 72 The Commission also recommended that the prohibition on growing cannabis for personal use be repealed. 73 In its view, these changes would foster more respect for the Narcotic Control Act among the populace and would codify their philosophy of basing the severity of penalties and the extent of prohibition on the potential harm that could be caused by the drug. 74 However, the Commission was hardly in agreement on these recommendations. One dissenter, Marie-Andr6e Bertrand, 75 suggested removing cannabis from the schedules of the Narcotic Control Act entirely, thus leading to a policy of "controlled legalization. [Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS agreed with the majority in most respects; however, he recommended that cannabis possession remain illegal. 7 " Despite the dissenters, Minister of Health John Munro committed to following some of the Commission's suggestions on treating marijuana differently from the powerful narcotics with which it had been associated. 79 In November of 1974, Bill S-19, containing some of the reforms suggested by the Commission, was proposed in the Senate. 80 This Bill would have removed cannabis from the Schedules of the Narcotic Control Act and placed it under Section V of the Food and Drugs Act.
8 ' The new classification of cannabis products would have resulted in a drastic reduction in penalties for some cannabis-related offenses. 82 The Senate passed Bill S-19 in June of 1975 and referred it to the House of Commons for consideration. 3 The bill died there after two readings and was never considered for reintroduction. 8 
D. The Controlled Drug and Substances Act: The Current Policy
In 1992, Minister of Health Perrin Beatty proposed Bill C-85, which called for a unified law governing psychotropic substances." 8 This bill eventually became the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), 89 which became effective in 1996 and remains in effect today.' The CDSA merged the Narcotic Control Act and certain provisions of the Food and Drugs Act, resulting in a single piece of legislation governing all psychotropic substances in Canada. 9 '
Schedule 11 of the CDSA contains cannabis and its byproducts. 92 Schedules VII and VII were special sections, designed to reduce penalties for trafficking and possession, respectively, of small amounts of cannabis. 93 Part I of the CDSA defines the offenses and criminal penalties for trafficking, producing, cultivating, possessing, and importing and exporting the drugs listed in the various Schedules, including marijuana. 9 ' The marijuana offenses listed in Part I are slightly more lenient than under the Narcotic Control Act, 87 . See Cannabis Report, supra note 5, at 285. Canada's most significant change in policy was a more focused effort to curb trafficking, both local and international. See id. Other laws relating to drug trafficking, such as money laundering and enterprise crime, also became areas of emphasis in combating trafficking. [Vol. 14:1 and marijuana is separated from more dangerous drugs through use of the Schedules. 95
Marijuana Offenses and Punishments
Penalties for possession of marijuana, contained in section four of Part I, vary based on the amount possessed and whether the offender had any prior drug convictions. Possession is punishable by a maximum of five years in prison and a minimum $1,000 fine." Possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana results in a less severe sentence, carrying a maximum penalty of six months in prison and a $1,000 fine.
97
Trafficking offenses, contained in section five of Part I, are much more serious. 98 Trafficking over three kilograms of marijuana is punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment. 9 Trafficking an amount lower than three kilograms brings the offense under the purview of Schedule VII, making the offender subject to imprisonment of up to five years. '0 Section six describes offenses for importing and exporting controlled substances, which are punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment in the case of marijuana.' 0 ' Section seven deals with the production of illicit drugs, punishing the production or cultivation of marijuana by up to seven years in prison." 2 The existence of the Schedules to classify various substances, along with even more lenient penalties for marijuana violators, reflects a shift to a philosophy that penalties for drug offenses should vary based on the harm caused by that particular drug, with marijuana resting relatively low on the 95 . See Cannabis Report, supra note 5, at 288. For example, possession of a Schedule I substance, like cocaine, is punishable by a maximum of seven years in prison. See CDSA, supra note 9, § 4(3). Section 4(1) makes it illegal to possess any substance listed on Schedules I, H, or Ill. See id. § 4(l).
96. See CDSA, supra note 9, § 4(4).
See id. § 4(5)
. The statute says a person in possession of a Schedule I substance "in an amount that does not exceed the amount set out for that substance on Schedule VIII is guilty of an offen[s]e punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both. 
See id. § 5(3).
100. See id. § 5(4). Schedule VII operates in the same way as Schedule VII. See id. Schedule VII lists cannabis in amounts less than three kilograms, the trafficking of which results in the lighter penalty. See id.
101. See CDSA, supra note 9, § 6(3).
See id. § 7(2)(b).
2003] totem pole. 103 Although most of their policy suggestions were not made part of the CDSA, treating marijuana offenses differently from offenses with seemingly more harmful drugs is reminiscent of the strategy suggested by the Le Dain Commission in 1972, which focused on the relative harm caused by each drug and not simply its illicit status."°4
Medical Exemptions
Passed on June 20, 1996, section 56 of the CDSA allows the Minister of Health to exempt individuals or groups of individuals from any or all provisions of the CDSA.' 0 5 This means that the Minister has the discretion to authorize the use of marijuana to treat disease, but because no legal source of marijuana existed, as a practical matter, this section had little impact.'°6 The Governor in Council has additional authority, under section 55(1), to create regulations concerning the medical application of the substances in the CDSA, including cannabis. [Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS illnesses, a license to grow marijuana for that purpose, or a license allowing a third party to grow marijuana for them." ' Three categories of symptoms make individuals eligible to receive permits. Category 1 includes symptoms caused by terminal illness or the treatment of terminal illness."' Category 2 symptoms are ones associated with the treatment of AIDS, cancer, HIV, multiple sclerosis, spinal injuries, epilepsy, and severe arthritis. 1 2 Category 3 is a "catch-all" that allows access to marijuana for the treatment of symptoms not named in Category 1 or 2.' As of October 4, 2002, 405 authorizations to possess marijuana, 263 production licenses, and eighteen third-party production licenses have been granted by the Regulations." 4 The current Minister of Health, A. Anne McLellan," 5 has not officially conceded that marijuana is an effective treatment of illness symptoms, claiming instead that the Regulations are in place because of the popular belief among patients and physicians that smoking marijuana eases the pain and suffering of the gravely ill." 6 Although McLellan feels that this belief is widespread enough to justify limited access, scientific research should continue to better determine the benefits and risks of marijuana as a medicine.'
II. A NEW REFORM MOVEMENT: THE CANNABIS REPORT OF 2002
The Canadian government's marijuana policy seems to flow through the same patterns as the United States, beginning with an early and somewhat 111. See MMAR, supra note 110. § 1. Section 1 defines all crucial terms in the Regulations, including "category 1 symptom," "category 2 symptom," and "category 3 symptom. " Id. 112. See id. The symptoms associated with these diseases include nausea, anorexia, weight loss, severe pain, seizures, and muscle spasms. See id. § 73.
113. See id. § 1. Section 1 defines a Category 3 symptom as one "other than a category 1 or 2 symptom, that is associated with a medical condition or its medical treatment. " Id. 114. 
A. The Senate Committee's Research
The Senate Committee separated its research strategy into five areas. First, it set out to examine social, economic, historical, criminological, and political issues surrounding the use and regulation of marijuana.' 22 Second, it wanted to gather information on the medical and pharmacological properties that marijuana may or may not possess and its effectiveness in treating disease or symptoms of disease. 2 3 Third, the Senate Committee examined the legal aspects of marijuana on a national level. 24 Fourth, it wanted to examine marijuana-related political and legal issues at the international level, focusing on U.S.-Canada relations and Canada's status as a member of many international drug treaties and conventions. 125 Finally, it set out to investigate behavioral and moral standards of Canadians themselves, looking at tolerance levels among the populace, behavioral norms, and other issues.'
26
To successfully and fully investigate these five axes, the Senate Committee took two paths. It first set out to synthesize current scientific and social data on marijuana use and abuse contained in existing literature, [Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS including a Senate Committee-sponsored public opinion survey, and second, it heard testimony in public hearings from witnesses from a variety of fields. 1 27
The Senate Committee was relentless in ensuring its own objectivity and tirelessly examined its most basic philosophies about the operation of government, the core purposes of criminal law, and the constantly changing relationship between government and citizen.' 28
B. Crucial Findings
The Senate Committee's research was extensive. 29 Data received by the Senate Committee indicates that thirty percent of the population between the ages of twelve and sixty-four has tried marijuana at least once. 30 Two million Canadians have used marijuana in the past twelve months.' Most people who experiment with marijuana stop using it, and most people who use long-term were introduced to the drug at a young age, with the average age of introduction being fifteen. 3 2 The Senate Committee found that cannabis use itself is not a cause of delinquency, crime, or violence.' 33 Seventy percent of all drug charges involve marijuana, with forty-three percent of the charges being for marijuana possession.' 34 Cannabis has a significantly lower addiction rate when compared to alcohol and tobacco. 35 An examination of "danger factors" led to the conclusion that alcohol and tobacco are, in some respects, more harmful to the individual and society than marijuana.
36
Most importantly, based on all the data it received, the Committee concluded that, "for the vast majority of recreational users, cannabis use presents no harmful consequences for physical, psychological or social well-being in either the short or the long term." ' This was based on a U.S. study, which determined that thirty-two percent of fifteen-year-olds to fifty-two-year-olds who became addicted after a single use of tobacco. See id. Of those who used alcohol once, 15% became addicted; whereas 4.2% of onetime cannabis users became addicted. See id.
136. See id. at 161. The "danger factors" include the degree of physical dependence, psychic dependence, neurotoxicity, general toxicity, and danger to society. See id. In most of these categories alcohol and tobacco were given a "high" or "very high" rating, while cannabis received a "low" or "very low" rating in all categories. See id.
137. Id. at 165.
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society, when compared with heroin and cocaine or even alcohol and tobacco.
38

C. The Senate Committee's Recommendations
On the whole, the Senate Committee's recommendations are a drastic departure from Canada's current marijuana policy. Their significance is highlighted by the fact that drug use is such a politically volatile issue that divides the Canadian public almost in half. 139 Taking bold stances on controversial issues is a difficult thing for politicians to do, which seems to lend some political genuineness to the Senate Committee's policy recommendations.
Changes in Recreational Use Policy
Since its unexplained addition to the Opium Act in 1923,140 recreational use of marijuana has been illegal in Canada, and the CDSA prohibition of this type of use is fairly typical when compared with the United States policies against possession. 14' The Senate Committee has recommended sweeping amendments to the CDSA that would permit Canadian citizens over sixteen years of age to obtain marijuana. 42 Believing the CDSA lacks a basic objective, the Senate Committee first recommended amending the law to include a "general aims" section. 43 The primary aim should be " [t] o reduce the injurious effects of the criminalization of the use and possession of cannabis and its derivatives. "' 44 Another aim of the bill, contrary to the implied aim of the current CDSA, would be to permit persons over sixteen years old to obtain marijuana at licensed distribution centers. 4 A final aim would be to recognize the mental and physical risks of excessive marijuana use and to regulate the production and use of marijuana to prevent excessive use. 1 46 The first substantive amendments suggested include the granting of licenses to allow Canadian residents to distribute marijuana with several 145. See Summary Report, supra note 130, at 52. The Committee proposed that consumption in public places frequented by children under 16 years of age should not be permitted. See id. at 53.
146. See id. at 52.
[Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS restrictions. Distributors must not sell to individuals under sixteen years old and would be forbidden from advertising their product in any way, including displays. "' Those seeking distributors' licenses must not have criminal records, and they may only obtain marijuana from licensed producers. 4 ' The Senate Committee also recommended that Canadian residents be able to obtain licenses to produce cannabis, both for sale to licensed distributors and personal use.' 9 It suggested amending the CDSA to allow for an exemption to permit cannabis cultivation in small quantities 5 ' for personal use on the condition that it cannot be exchanged for consideration, monetary or otherwise, or promoted by the grower in any other way. ' A license to produce for sale would also be permitted, as long as the grower keeps detailed records of sales, THC quantities, and production conditions. 5 ' Tobacco companies would be forbidden from obtaining these licenses, and licensed growers would not be allowed to advertise.
3
These changes, obviously, would transform the CDSA into a law designed to expressly permit what it previously forbade. Marijuana would essentially be sold in a way quite similar to tobacco in the United States, complete with restrictions on advertising and other substantial government regulations. ' 
Changes in Medical Use Policy
Since 1996, the Canadian government has allowed the use of marijuana for therapeutic purposes, but only after the adoption of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations has the Department of Health actually started to grant permits to use medical marijuana.' The Regulations have provided Canadians with grave illnesses the opportunity to petition the government for permits to use marijuana. 5 
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the current Regulations extend far enough to make marijuana accessible to the average person in need.' 57 The amendments to the Regulations recommended by the Senate Committee are designed to make access much easier and broaden the class of those eligible to benefit from marijuana's therapeutic properties. For example, the Senate Committee would include those who suffer from chronic accidentrelated pain, migraines, and chronic headaches, along with those currently eligible. 5 8 It would eliminate the "last resort" provision in the current Regulations, which states that all conventional therapies must have been tried or considered before marijuana use would be permitted. 5 9 It would eliminate the current "category" system and simply enumerate the medical conditions and symptoms for which marijuana can be used." 6 The Senate Committee proposes that the patient be able to buy the marijuana from distributors instead of having to grow it himself or find a third party to do so.' 6 ' Current Regulations allow only dried marijuana to be used, 162 but the Senate Committee's proposal would broaden that to include all cannabis derivatives with the dosage to be determined by the patient in consultation with the distribution center, as opposed to the doctor setting the dosage under the current Regulations. 1 6 3
Similar to the provisions for recreational distribution, the Senate Committee recommends that a Canadian resident be able to obtain a license to distribute marijuana for medical purposes. '" The only differences between the medical distribution license and the recreational distribution license is that the medical distributor must keep records on buyers' medical conditions and side effects and take steps to ensure the product's safety for medical use.
65
Licenses to produce cannabis for medical purposes would operate in a similar manner to those for recreational use, under the restrictions set forth by the 157. See Cannabis Report, supra note 5, at 308. "[lIt is apparent that the MMAR have become a barrier to access." Id. "Rather than providing a compassionate framework, the regulations are unduly restricting the availability of cannabis to those who may receive health benefit from its use." Id. This would be in direct conflict with the primary purpose of the Regulations themselves. See id.
158. See Summary Report, supra note 130, at 51. 159. See Cannabis Report, supra note 5, at 317. Currently the Regulations state that when a person applies to the Office of Cannabis Medical Access, a physician must recommend marijuana and contend that "all conventional treatments for the symptom have been tried, or have at least been considered." CDSA, supra note 9, § 6(3)(b). The applicant must also demonstrate that these conventional treatments were or would be ineffective. See id.
160 [Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS Senate Committee. 166 The only difference is that if a producer sells recreational cannabis to distributors, it may not also sell medical cannabis. 67 The Senate Committee concluded that the low participation in the medical marijuana program shows that the current Regulations fail to grant the kind of access they were intended to provide. 6 1 While this may be true, the low participation rate could just as easily be due to other factors to which the Senate Committee gives little weight. Specifically, marijuana is not an approved drug product.' 6 9 Scientific evidence is inconclusive as to its therapeutic benefits. 70 Doctors who recommend marijuana to patients may be in derogation of professional rules relating to alternative medicines. 7 ' And finally, smoking marijuana is an unhealthy delivery mechanism.' 7 2 It is unclear why these factors were dismissed as likely causes of low participation among mainstream society. The fact that medical marijuana can be obtained illegally from Canadian "compassion clubs" is also dismissed.
7 3 The Senate Committee suggests that these clubs would still play a crucial role, under their proposed scheme, either as licensed distributors or producers.' 74 All factors considered, the Senate Committee's recommendations regarding medical marijuana are far less radical than the ones suggested for recreational use. The Senate Committee appears to be focusing more on expanding eligibility to receive medical marijuana than completely eradicating the current regulatory regime. Although scientific evidence is inconclusive about the actual benefits of marijuana as a medicine, the Canadian government has already made a qualified commitment to provide it to those who believe 166 
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it will alleviate their suffering.' 7 5 The Senate Committee's goal of refining this commitment is reasonable, and at least one Canadian judge agrees, stating that "federal regulations ... made it extremely difficult for applicants to obtain approval to use marijuana."' 176
Prevention and Harm Reduction
The Senate Committee concedes that the war on marijuana is one that cannot be won, calling the goal of cannabis policy to reduce supply and consumption a "complete failure. "' 177 This conclusion leads to a fork in the road: down one road is the policy of decriminalization, and down the other road is the policy of legalization.' 78 The Senate Committee chose the latter, feeling that decriminalization would cause the government, from a policy standpoint, to ignore the potential problems marijuana presents.
17 9 Canada's proposed legalization scheme, obviously, will increase the availability of marijuana. The Senate Committee also focused its attention on how to prevent abuse and minimize the social and health problems caused by marijuana abuse, not only through the regulations described above, but through prevention and harm reduction programs.' 8 ' Although the Senate Committee did not identify and develop these programs itself, it made important observations to guide legislators." ' Most importantly, it stated that prevention should not be designed to control and manipulate young people through inflammatory statements about marijuana but to give them the knowledge to make informed decisions. 82 The Senate Committee believes that "alarmist rhetoric" on the effects of marijuana is counterproductive. 1 83 Such propaganda is quickly undermined when young people see their friends smoking marijuana at parties without "frying their brains. "' 4 The Senate Committee, as a way to fight the damaging effects of marijuana use, also suggested using the technique of harm reduction. 8 [Vol. 14:1 SMOKE AND MIRRORS minimization of harm to the individual and society. 8 6 In reference to marijuana, these programs would take the form of discouraging certain types of abuse, such as driving while under the influence of marijuana and smoking in ways more damaging to health.' 87 Because these programs seem to implicitly encourage use, or at least end government disapproval of use, they would be likely to meet public resistance, similar to programs that distribute free needles to drug addicts or condoms to students. 8 Nevertheless, they are probably necessary steps to prevent a new class of users from turning into abusers.
International Issues
As a major economic power, Canada is a participant in many international drug treaties, including the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 8 9 the Convention on Psychotropic Substances,' and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.' 9 ' These treaties impose obligations on member nations, and the Senate Committee believes these obligations to be "utterly irrational" and having "nothing to do with scientific or public health considerations."' 92 The Senate Committee's policy suggestions would violate Canada's obligations to create criminal penalties for drug offenses, including possession, distribution, and cultivation of cannabis.' 93 The Senate Committee recommended that Canada notify the international community of its intent to request that cannabis be removed from the schedules of drug treaties, effectively declassifying it.' 94 Canada would then have to choose whether to remain in contravention of those treaties until the amendment is made or temporarily withdraw from the treaties.' 95 The Senate Committee suggested the latter because it would enable Canada to more effectively lobby for the exclusion of cannabis from the schedules of these treaties. 116 Aside from violations of these agreements, the Senate Committee had to consider the impact of a policy change on relations with its southern neighbor, the United States. Exporting cannabis from Canada and selling marijuana to non-Canadian residents would remain illegal. 97 These two provisions were designed to prevent Canada's policy choices from spilling over into the United States. 9 Nevertheless, this may be an unavoidable side effect, as it was during the era of Prohibition in the 1920's. 9 Relations with the United States have already been tested over the issue of medical marijuana. When Canada began its program, the government attempted to buy cannabis seeds from the United States National Institute on Drug Abuse to establish a farm. 20 ' Their offer was rejected, and the government was forced to use seeds confiscated from criminals. 2°2 The medical program has also inspired some Americans to cross the border to obtain medical marijuana without fear of punishment. 2 3 A more indirect problem was recognized by former U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency head Asa Hutchinson, 2° who indicated that mere talk of legalization "increases the rumblings in [the United States] that we ought to reexamine our policy. It is a distraction from a firm policy on drug use. 2 5 The Senate Committee, however, believes that Canada should be a leader in North American drug policy and inciting a reexamination of United States marijuana policy is viewed as a positive step in their eyes, not a "distraction. '' 2 16 III. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF DUTCH MARIJUANA POLICY Due to its drug policies, the Netherlands has been called everything from "a markedly relevant example to the world ' 2 0 7 to "[a] latter-day Sodom and Gomorrah.,, 2 08 Like any other policy, the Netherlands' policy on marijuana developed in a historical context that is completely unique. In order to understand the policy, that context must be briefly explored.
A. The Modem History of Marijuana in the Netherlands
Marijuana use in the Netherlands was almost nonexistent before World War 1.2" Immediately following the war, marijuana use appeared to be isolated to artists and writers. 2t 0 At this point, authorities were powerless to prosecute these people because marijuana was not yet prohibited.
21
' When marijuana was banned in 1953, enforcement of the new law was concentrated primarily on American soldiers stationed in Germany and visiting the Netherlands while on leave. 2 " Dutch citizens obtained marijuana from sailors and then sold it to the soldiers. 213 These Dutch smugglers and American soldiers comprised most of the arrests for marijuana offenses in this early period. 21 4 Sentences for possession were rather light. 2 1 5 For example, a painter arrested with two marijuana cigarettes was convicted and sentenced to a threemonth suspended sentence. goal of Dutch drug policy, a phenomenon known as "separation of the markets.
27
The Baan Commission led to eventual reforms of the Opium Act in 1976 which resulted in the decriminalization of marijuana."' Being a member of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Netherlands was not permitted to legalize marijuana, instead treating it similarly to tobacco and alcohol. 229 In order to accomplish its "separation of the markets" goal, the Netherlands resorted to a policy of de facto decriminalization, in which marijuana crimes were still illegal but, through an administrative mandate, were not prosecuted. 230 The Netherlands chose this route, and the policy remains in effect today.
B. The Current Policy
Similar to the CDSA, the Opium Act separates drugs into schedules based on the relative harms they cause. 21 Hard drugs like cocaine, heroin, LSD, and amphetamines are placed on Schedule I, whereas cannabis and its derivatives are placed on Schedule I.232 Due to the "expediency principle, 233 possession, trafficking, manufacturing, and importing and exporting substances in either Schedule remain illegal under the Opium Act, but, in practice, punishments vary a great deal.
Under the expediency principle, soft drug offenses remain illegal, but the Ministry of Justice sets "Guidelines" that prioritize certain offenses, such as trafficking hard and soft drugs, over ones deemed of less importance, such as soft drug possession and consumption. 234 The Guidelines direct the Public Prosecutions Department 23 5 to investigate and prosecute some offenses but not others.
2 36 For example, possession of less than five grams of soft drugs is given the lowest priority. 237 As a practical matter, possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana is not even investigated, much less prosecuted. This unique policy effectively maintains the Netherlands' compliance with the Single Convention, while at the same time permitting marijuana use. 239 The "separation of the markets" concept would be completely ineffective if Dutch citizens were not able to grow or purchase marijuana legally, even if possession had been decriminalized. They would have been forced to purchase from the same dealers that sold marijuana before decriminalization, thus exposing themselves to hard drugs in the process. For this reason, the Guidelines exempt certain types of drug dealers, "coffee shop" owners, from criminal prosecution. 2 "° The Guidelines state that such a dealer will be prosecuted only when he "publicly projects himself as a dealer or runs his business provokingly in other ways," namely through advertising. 24 ' But the retail marijuana trade became so established, especially in Amsterdam, 24 2 that coffee shops no longer needed to advertise at all. 243 The AHJO-G criteria 244 also govern the coffee shops, 245 forbidding the shops from advertising, selling to children under eighteen years of age, selling more than five grams of soft drugs, and selling any amount of hard drugs. 24 The market separation theory has been very effective. 247 Asking for hard drugs in an Amsterdam coffee shop has been called as absurd as it is to ask "an average butcher's shop.., for a zebra steak." 248 However, in recent years, the number of coffee shops has declined significantly. 249 
C. Effectiveness of Dutch Decriminalization
Unlike the Americans or Canadians, the Dutch never viewed marijuana as a social evil that should be eradicated. 25° While American and Canadian policy viewed marijuana, and drugs in general, as a character flaw that could be eliminated through deterrence and supply control, the Dutch have never subscribed to this philosophy. 251 Given that the goal of Dutch policy since 1976 has been to limit the harms caused by marijuana and prevent users from exposure to more dangerous drugs, its effectiveness cannot be analyzed by examining the volume of users, which is the traditional American or Canadian measuring sticks for successful policy.
With this in mind, it is certainly a curious phenomenon that the number of marijuana users in the Netherlands has stabilized since decriminalization in 1976, as opposed to the obvious prediction of a steady increase in use. 252 Despite greater availability of marijuana in the Netherlands, use has neither declined nor increased when compared with the United States. 253 The real success of the Dutch marijuana policy lies in the separation of hard drug markets from soft drug markets. 2 54 By integrating marijuana use into societal norms, the Netherlands has prevented the multitude of casual experimenters from thrusting themselves into criminal drug dealing circles. 255 
